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Abstract
The meaning of life is not just some ordinary old philosophical problem, but 
also a practical one that, in some form, everyone wonders about. The whole 
meaning of life has always been linked with belief in higher values  that form 
the incentive for the spiritual uplift of humanity. Even if spiritual values  are 
illusions, they are absolutely necessary in order to give life meaning. When 
they disappear, it causes a serious disease of the axiological consciousness 
of man. The characters that are involved in the cultural stage hosting this 
drama are the idealist, who sets values  as necessary illusions of the human 
spirit, and the wise man, who shatters any illusion of salvation through 
faith in values.
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EL FRACASO AXIOLÓGICO DE LA VIDA
Resumen
El sentido de la vida no es solamente un antiguo y común problema filosófico, 
sino también uno práctico que, de cierta forma, cualquiera plantea. Todo el 
sentido de la vida siempre fue correlacionado con la creencia en algunos 
valores superiores que constituyeron impulsos para el ennoblecimiento 
espiritual del hombre. Aunque los valores espirituales sean ilusiones, ellos 
son absolutamente necesarios para poder dar sentido a la vida. Cuando ellos 
desaparecen, se produce una grave enfermedad de la conciencia axiológica 
del hombre. Los personajes que intervienen en el escenario de la cultura 
en este drama son el idealista, el que instituye los valores como ilusiones 
necesarias del espíritu humano y el sabio, que pierde cualquier ilusión 
relativa a la salvación mediante la creencia en los valores.
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University “Alexandru Ioan Cuza” Iaşi, Romania
A new praise of folly
Perhaps not coincidentally, the great philosophers and writers have used 
‘madness’ to highlight the ‘wrongs of the world’, as Don Quixote, ‘the most 
amusing madman’ in the world, puts it many times. Also Prince Muishkin, 
from Dostoevsky’s famous novel The Idiot, is an amusing madman, as is the 
character chosen by Friedrich Nietzsche to announce the death of God. The 
‘madness’ of the latter is in fact the interpretation of this statement, especially 
in that it expresses metaphorically a truth so bad that it is impossible for the 
public ever to accept it. The entire speech about the death of God is like a 
diagnosis given by the philosopher as a doctor of the civilised world. He 
suffers from a disease that can be called the axiological bankruptcy of life, 
a disease that occurs when confidence in all values  is fully lost and thus no 
sense of life can maintained.
Posdnicheff, the main character in The Kreutzer Sonata by Leo Tolstoy, 
suffers from this axiological illness. He considers himself a kind of madman, 
not because he is out of his mind, but because he is too lucid. Normality 
implies a minimum of illusions. ‘I am a wreck, a cripple. I have one quality. 
I know’.( Tolstoi, 1971, p. 57.)  Posdnicheff knows that values  are only 
illusions necessary for life to be imbued with meaning. It is, moreover, 
the interpretation that Tolstoy himself provides in the Afterword to The 
Kreutzer Sonata: it is not rules but ideals that people need for their being 
not to degenerate.
N
ic
o
la
e 
R
â
m
b
u
The fact that The Kreutzer Sonata, published in 1889, had huge 
success throughout the world does not represent a symptom of decline or 
degeneration of the civilised world, Max Nordau says (Nordau, 1894, I, 
pp. 263 – 264), but rather is a cause for concern about the impossibility of 
living in a world completely free of illusions.
As long as there is faith in divinity, the meaning of life is not even 
questioned. It is self-evident. But when ‘the madman’ announces that 
‘God is dead’, he means that the higher values,  symbolised traditionally 
by God, thus fall into desuetude and so the life of the individual, of the 
society where he lives and the entire universe, loses any sense. ‘Where 
is it moving to now? Where are we moving to? Away from all suns? Are 
we not continually falling? And backwards, sidewards, forwards, in all 
directions? Is there still an up and a down? Aren’t we straying as though 
through an infinite nothing? Isn’t empty space breathing at us?’(Nietzsche, 
2001, p. 120 ) The madman, in the words of Nietzsche, was greeted by 
the crowd with a laugh, as has happened in history with all idealists. 
‘The madman’ is actually the most lucid of mortals. In fact, the crowd 
who believed in nothing was seized with madness. In a dramatic manner, 
Friedrich Nietzsche expressed in this parable the axiological bankruptcy 
of life.
‘It is still recounted how on the same day the madman forced his way 
into several churches and there started singing his requiem aeternam deo. 
Led out and called to account, he is said always to have replied nothing 
but, “What then are these churches now if not the tombs and sepulchres 
of God?”’ (Nietzsche, 2001, p. 120) What does Friedrich Nietzsche really 
mean by his ‘madman’? That, already long ago, a transformation was made 
of the religion of Jesus into one about Jesus. Or, in other words, that we do 
not have to replace the ideal of Jesus with external ordinances, as Tolstoy 
stated via his hero in The Kreutzer Sonata.
Jesus himself, as mentioned in the New Testament, is taken, when 
selecting his twelve apostles, as one for whom it is true that ‘He is out 
of his’ (Mark, 3.21), even by those in his own family. But one who is not 
only the creator of a new table of values, but also believes in them and acts 
according to them, has always been regarded as one who is not exactly 
sane. Don Quixote is the embodiment of such an ‘idiot’. But the ‘madman’ 
in Cervantes’s novel is the most lucid of mortals. He ‘sees’ what the spirit 
of any man should essentially ‘see’. Fascinated to delirium by the light 
of truth, goodness, love, beauty and all positive values, Don Quixote is 
different from other people who are blind from an axiological point of 
view. For them, reality is only what they can grab with their hands, as Plato 
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puts it; by contrast, he lives, rather, in the world of Ideas, so he becomes a 
laughing stock.
Precisely this laughing stock is invoked by Plato in the famous myth 
of the cave when describing the reunion of the one who ‘saw Ideas’ with 
ordinary people, citizens of the ‘world of shadows’. In the Republic, Plato 
distinguishes, as we know, an intelligible world, or one of Ideas, and a 
sensitive one, metaphorically called the ‘world of shadows’. Let us imagine, 
says Plato, several people sitting in a cave, facing a wall projecting the 
shadows of different objects that pass behind them. For them, ‘reality’ 
is nothing more than this shadow. Their world is therefore ‘the world of 
shadows’. ‘Take a man who is released and suddenly compelled to stand 
up, to turn his neck around, to walk and look up toward the light; and who, 
moreover, in doing all this is in pain and, because he is dazzled, is unable to 
make out those things whose shadows he saw before. What do you suppose 
he’d say if someone were to tell him that before he saw silly nothings, while 
now, because he is somewhat nearer to what is and more turned toward 
beings, he sees more correctly?’(Plato, 1991, p. 194) Finally, the person 
who has been released not only acquires a correct perception of what is in 
the cave, but he leaves ‘the world of shadows’ to stand up in the sunlight. 
After enduring all the pain of turning, metaphorically rendered by Plato, 
he gets to contemplate the world above. ‘In applying the going up and the 
seeing of what’s above to the soul’s journey up to the intelligible place, you’ll 
not mistake my expectation’. (Plato, 1991, p. 196) The sun symbolises the 
Idea of Good such that, if you manage to contemplate it, it will fascinate 
you to a such an extent that you will never be able to commit evil. This is 
the meaning of the famous saying of Socrates, that no one does evil other 
than from ignorance. It is known that people have always perpetrated hurt 
knowingly; there have always been evil plans to do harm. But there is a 
deeper meaning to the saying of Socrates. The ‘ignorance’ refers only to not 
knowing the Idea of Good. Those who come to contemplate the Good, being 
ecstatic, ‘aren’t willing to mind the business of human beings, but rather … 
their souls are allways eager to spend their time above’. (Plato, 1991, p. 196)
Such an idealist ‘looks up’, even when he is back down in the world 
of shadows; but then comes something that particularly interests us in this 
essay about a new praise of folly: he is mocked by ordinary people and 
considered a madman. ‘And what about this? Do you suppose it is anything 
surprising, ... if a man, come from acts of divine contemplation to the human 
evils, is graceless and looks quite ridiculous when – with his sight still 
dim and before he has gotten sufficiently accustomed to the surrounding 
darkness – he is compelled in courts or elsewhere to contest about the 
201
N
ic
o
la
e 
R
â
m
b
u
shadows of the just or the representations of which they are the shadows, 
and to dispute about the way these things are understood by men who have 
never seen justice itself?’ (Plato, 1991, p. 196) Therefore, in the sensitive 
world, the only reality recognised by most people, there is no good, justice, 
love; in short, there are no values, but only their pitiful shadows. Obviously, 
whoever has once known true love or the Idea of love cannot be complacent 
anymore in the ‘barbaric bog’ of the relations that people establish ‘as the 
world’, but will always ‘look up’, as Plato says, to the world of Ideas and 
another love that is described by an expression that made  history: platonic 
love. It is understood that in the ‘world of shadows’, such characters will 
be ‘laughing stocks’ becausethey are really unlike the world. Plato says 
bluntly: it is not the one who ‘sees’ Ideas or values  in modern language 
who is the ‘madman’, but the people who laugh at him. ‘But if a man were 
intelligent, he would remember that there are two kinds of disturbances of 
the eyes, stemming from two sources – when they have been transferred 
from light to darkness and when they have been transferred from darkness to 
light. And if he held that these same things happen to a soul too, whenever 
he saw one that is confused and unable to make anything out, he wouldn’t 
laugh without reasoning but would go on to consider whether, come from 
a brighter life, it is in darkness for want of being accustomed, or whether, 
going from greater lack of learning to greater brightness, it is dazzled by 
the greater brilliance. And then he would deem the first soul happy for its 
condition and its life, while he would pity the second. And, if he wanted to 
laugh at the second soul, his laughing in this case would be less a laugh of 
scorn than would his laughing at the soul which has come from above out 
of the light.’ (Plato, 1991, pp. 196–197)
Between Don Quixote de la Mancha and the world that laughs at him 
there seems to be the same relationship as that experienced by Plato’s 
character who ‘sees’ Ideas and then returns among his peers in the world 
of shadows. The common element is that of the laughing stock. Because 
Don Quixote is a loser idealist, and only from this point of view, he is a Sad 
Figure. The bachelor Samson Carrasco woke him up to reality, brought him 
down to earth and so destroyed him. ‘My reason is now free and clear, rid 
of the dark shadows of ignorance that my unhappy constant study of those 
detestable books of chivalry cast over it. Now I see through their absurdities 
and deceptions, and it only grieves me that this destruction of my illusions 
has come so late that it leaves me no time to make some amends by reading 
other books that might be a light to my soul. Niece, I feel myself at the 
point of death’(Cervantes, 2014), says Don Quixote, serenely, when he 
realises that absolutely all his great illusions are lost forever. Death comes 
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as something natural, because nobody could live without a certain naivety. 
Without a minimum of illusions we are all lost. It is precisely what the death 
of Don Quixote symbolises. And just to save him from the death of lucidity 
produced naturally painful, Samson Carrasco and others close to the dying 
do all that is possible for Alonso Quixano to be again the knight errant who 
he had once been. But ‘now I perceive my folly’, says Don Quixote, shortly 
before he dies. But to postpone this death, coming without any portent, once 
the famous hidalgo has forever lost its illusions, the one who has caused 
all this drama, the bachelor says: ‘What? Senor Don Quixote! Now that we 
have intelligence of the lady Dulcinea being disenchanted, are you taking 
this line!’ (Cervantes, 2014) But any attempt to restore his lost ideals proves 
to be doomedto failure. He, who had the most illusions, ends up with none.
The fact that this work of Cervantes passes as a comedy confirms the 
truth that ‘madmen’ are those for which the romance of the Knight of the 
Sad Figure has no value. But only those who sincerely believe in values  and 
struggle for ideals push the world forward. Only through these aristocrats 
of the spirit does humanity ‘looks up’, as Plato says.
The epitaph composed by Samson Carrasco is in anticipation of the 
extraordinary adventure of Cervantes’s character in the culture of humanity. 
Death is not able to kill Don Quixote. Moreover, ‘at his feats the world 
was scared’. After all, why should the world be scared of an idealist, a 
romantic, so fragile through his romance itself? Because Don Quixote is like 
a mirror in which the reader can see his true face, his pettiness, selfishness 
and meanness. For this reason the idealist is a public danger. He must be 
murdered through laughter. He should be made a laughing stock, defamed, 
annihilated at any price. Or if any of this is not possible, then he is allowed 
to pass as ‘a poor madman’, who must not be regarded by ‘normal’ people 
when he says, for instance, that ‘virtue is of herself so mighty, that … she 
will come victorious out of every trial, and shed her light upon the earth as 
the sun does upon the heavens’. (Cervantes, 2014)
Don Quixote’s perception of values  is absolutely correct until it is 
completely ripped from the world of the highest values  and thrown by the 
loss of all illusions into ‘normality’ or a ‘barbaric bog’, to use a phrase of 
Plato’s. (Plato, 1991, p. 2012) The idealist expects the world to be tailored 
by a good God rationally, according to the highest ideals, or at least to be 
easily transformed in such a direction, but is ultimately forced to conclude 
that it ‘has no God’, as they say – no sense. Hegel once gave a reply, now 
very well known, to a student who noticed that his theory was perfect, but 
did not quite fit reality: Um so schlimmer für die Wirklichkeit!( Spranger, 
1930, p. 139) – so much the worse for reality. If the world does not fit with 
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the ideals of Don Quixote, so much the worse, you might say, paraphrasing 
the author of Phenomenology of Spirit, he also being obsessed by the 
Knight of the Sad Figure (Kirn, 1989, pp. 292–295), similar to the whole 
romantic generation who saw in Don Quixote ‘a highly philosophical book’.
( Neumeister, 2005, p. 310) It has been said rightly that the germ of modern 
philosophic idealism is found in Don Quixote. (Parker, 1968, p. 18)
The delirium perception that Don Quixote has of an infinite devotion 
to the highest values is the price paid for the correct axiological perception. 
But this madman whom Dostoevsky took as a model for the hero of his 
famous novel The Idiot is much more worthy of esteem than all other 
‘normal’ people who suitably perceive the material world but are ‘blind’ to 
the world of spiritual values . Before losing his illusions, Don Quixote can 
say what Goethe would later state in the Roman Elegies: ‘See with a feeling 
eye: feel with a seeing hand’.
A painful axiological dilemma: idealism or wisdom
Despite the noble values he is trying to achieve, the idealist is 
everywhere ridiculed and considered a madman, but nobody laughs at 
the wise man; on the contrary, he has been esteemed and respected in all 
societies and in all ages. The wise man is the opposite of the idealist and 
romantic embodied by the ‘knight of virtue’, as Hegel calls Don Quixote 
in The Phenomenology of Spirit.
The wise man, as Arthur Schopenhauer depicts him in Aphorisms on 
Wisdom in Life, is in his essence infinitely less worthy of respect than the 
idealist destined to become a laughing stock. Why are wise men, then, valued 
so much? Because their wisdom has something of the chameleonism of the 
world, a world for which the spirit truly noble always ‘was the scarecrow’, as 
they say in the epitaph of the knight of virtue, while the wise men did so that 
the shortcomings from an axiological point of view to beseem some virtues. 
The idealist bets everything on essence, the wise man – on appearance.
The wise man of Arthur Schopenhauer is really a coward, a paltry, a 
ruthless profiteer, a barbarian who perfectly plays the comedy of the civilised 
man. He embodies positive values  only to a very limited extent and he is 
in no way an apologist for them. Otherwise, would he be worthy of the 
crowd’s esteem? The wise man is a selfish man because the ultimate goal 
of his ‘wisdom’ is his own well-being, not the good of others.
Not honesty, as a positive value, but dishonesty is what the wise man 
counts on; this is more reprehensible as it appears to be something else from 
a moral point of view. The wise man of Schopenhauer is the man of mask 
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and a genius of disguise. ‘To fight windmills’ is, for him, really madness. 
He sees the world as a show, so all that matters is the ‘staging’. From this 
perspective nothing matters other than the reaction of the ‘public’, and the 
‘public’ can be won over to giving him what satisfies his petty pride.
The wise man is an exceptional administrator of opportunities. 
Compared to quixotic idealism, wisdom is an art of human misery. It teaches 
you only how to hide your own weaknesses and how to take advantage of 
those of others. 
Yet we should not be so critical of the wise man and his masks. Friedrich 
Nietzsche says that every profound spirit needs a mask. The wise man is 
a profound spirit. He knows better than anyone that it is madness to put 
yourself on the world stage without wearing the suitable mask. In addition, 
he chooses either to live away from the unleashed world, or to slip through 
it and take advantage of its weaknesses, knowing also this essential fact: 
that it’s pointless to fight for ideals because you will be defeated anyway 
and you become, like Don Quixote, a ‘laughing stock’. Virtue has no chance 
against the progress of the world.
The wisdom in life preached by Arthur Schopenhauer in Aphorisms on 
Wisdom in Life is that of one who sees his life as being like a small business. 
Moreover, it is easy to note that most of the maxims from eudemonology 
are expressed in economic and financial terms: profit, price, capital, gain, 
bankruptcy, etc. You do not have to be a great psychoanalyst to realise that 
Schopenhauer was concerned to the point of mania to protect his own capital 
and increase the interests that would ensure him a peaceful life. 
As a wise trader sells his goods below the purchase price in a time of 
crisis to avoid bankruptcy, so the wise man, as the author of Aphorisms on 
Wisdom in Life conceives him, feels the need to ‘sell’ himself below his value 
when he must show himself to  be ‘inferior’ or conceal his merit.
The eudemonology of Arthur Schopenhauer, presented in an accessible, 
popular form in Aphorisms on Wisdom in Life, comes, as the name itself 
indicates, from the Greek eudaimonia – the art of being happy (Mittelstrass, 
1995, p. 600) – but it is about a strictly personal happiness, indifferent to 
others. Eudemonology, this ‘guide to a happy existence’(Schopenhauer, 
1902, p. 7) teaches you essentially that you do not have to design ideals to 
put the world in motion, to lift it, trying to adjust to them, but that, to have 
a quiet life, you must adapt to the ‘crookedness’ of the world, against which 
Don Quixote and idealists throughout time have reacted. Schopenhauer’s 
observation that ‘men are like children, in that, if you spoil them, they become 
naughty’(Schopenhauer, 1902, p. 148) is fair, but, when convinced that nothing 
could ever change human nature, the only wise thing to do is adapt to it, slip 
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unnoticed through life. In this case, the rule of life formulated, like so many 
others, in mercantile terms, sounds like this: ‘it is well not to be too indulgent 
or charitable with any one. You may take it as a general rule that you will 
not lose a friend by refusing him a loan, but that you are very likely to do so 
by granting it; and, for similar reasons, you will not readily alienate people 
by being somewhat proud and careless in your behavior; but if you are very 
kind and complaisant toward them, you will often make them arrogant and 
intolerable, and so a breach will ensue’. (Schopenhauer, 1902, pp. 148–149) 
Apparently, wisdom in life is always achieved through an axiological 
sacrifice. You can live peacefully, or even happily, only to the extent 
that you can effectively manage your cowardice. Wisdom is nothing but 
the art of being sneaky. The wise man does not ever intend to ‘align the 
crookedness’, as Don Quixote said many times, but to take advantage of it. 
Only a ‘madman’ such as the Knight of the Sad Figure, or Prince Muishkin 
of Dostoevsky’s The Idiot, may be unconditionally sincere and generous, 
and always align his thoughts to ‘high targets that are to do good to all and 
harm to anyone’(Cervantes, 2014). Midsummer madness, as the wise man 
would say. He knows that even when you really cherish someone it is better 
for you to be dishonest, to hide your true feelings.‘It is advisable to let every 
one of your acquaintance – whether man or woman – feel now and then 
that you could very well dispense with their company. This will consolidate 
friendship. Nay, with most people there will be no harm in occasionally 
mixing a grain of disdain with your treatment of them; that will make them 
value your friendship all the more. Chi non istima vien stimato, as a subtle 
Italian proverb has it – to disregard is to win regard. But if we really think 
very highly of a person, we should conceal it from him like a crime. This 
is not a very gratifying thing to do, but it is right. Why, a dog will not bear 
being treated too kindly, let alone a man!’ (Schopenhauer, 1902, p. 149) If 
this is wisdom, then, from an axiological point of view, it is a catastrophe. 
It is true that the wise man is not naive; on the contrary he has a merciless 
lucidity. He sees better than anyone else the ‘crookedness’ of the world, but 
he indulges in it. The wise man knows that our world is hopelessly bad, the 
worst of all possible worlds, so it would be crazy to attempt to change it.
Comparing the wise man of Arthur Schopenhauer with the ‘madman’ 
of Cervantes you are faced with an axiological dilemma: lucidity without 
grandeur or greatness without lucidity, because it is clear  that someone 
who sees his own life as a small business that is somewhat profitable 
cannot sacrifice himself for ideals. The wise man knows, for instance, that 
‘Politeness is a tacit agreement that People’s miserable defects, whether 
moral or intellectual, shall on either side be ignored and not made the 
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subject of reproach; and since these defects are thus rendered somewhat 
less obtrusive, the result is mutually advantageous’. (Schopenhauer, 1902, p. 
164) Schopenhauer resumes in this way an idea common to most moralists, 
adding, as his own contribution, a mercantile comparison: ‘For politeness is 
like a counter – an avowedly false coin, with which it is foolish to be stingy. 
A sensible man will be generous in the use of it’. (Schopenhauer, 1902, p. 
164) There it is – how low the wise man can be, how perfectly duplicitous, 
compared with the idealist as aristocrat of the spirit. In his politeness, he is 
generous with the fake currency and stingy beyond measure with the true one.
Opposite to the wise man is the idealist embodied by Don Quixote. 
He exaggerates inthe direction of good. If this world is not the best of all 
possible worlds, it may become so. The natural goodness of Don Quixote that 
Cervantes repeatedly emphasises is projected onto the world. Unlike the wise 
man, whose fundamental concern is to sneak in a cowardly fashion among 
people, fitting his mask well, without even trying to change anything for 
the better, the idealist endeavours with of all his powers to become what he 
should be and also to change the world, to put in motion his ideals – to make 
of it, despite the pessimism of the wise men, the best of all possible worlds.
In the Critique of Pure Reason, Immanuel Kant emphasises die 
großeMacht der Illusion. (Kant, 1993, p. 568) Illusions are a part of human 
beings. A man without a certain amount of delusion would be unthinkable, 
or, if there was one, he could not survive more than a few moments. Without 
the faculty of delusion, not only the happiness of a human being but his 
very survival would be practically impossible. However, when it exceeds 
a certain limit, the colossal power of illusion that Immanuel Kant refers 
to turns on you and crushes you, like a medicine taken in too high a dose 
which turns into poison.
Conclusions
The meaning of life has always been linked to a higher set of values 
that each man, according to his ability, tends to realise. The paradox is that 
all creators of values, without exception, were regarded as madmen. But 
their ‘madness’ is actually the symptom of decadence and the madness of 
the world itself. 
The opposite of the idealist who always passes for a ‘madman’ in the 
eyes of most people is the wise man, as he is presented by Schopenhauer in 
Aphorisms on Wisdom in Life. It is understood that, to avoid the axiological 
bankruptcy of life, the idealist, with his ‘madness’, deserves more respect 
than it is usually granted. 
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